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Elie Wiesel, Nobel Prize Winning writer: 'Refugees are
persons doomed to live in divided world between countries in which
they cannot live and countries which they may not enter.'
US Committee for Refugees, 1997 World Refugee
Survey: 'Never was asylum in more doubt in more places than in
1996 ... (but) ...the challenge to asylum did not start in 1996.
The principle of asylum has been eroding for years. And the erosion
did not start in Africa. It started in Europe and United States.'
Introduction
I would like to congratulate the organisers of this symposium for the
timeliness of the event, although when they planned it they could not
have known the full details of the recent grim and unsatisfactory Executive
Committee meeting of UNHCR. Given the deafening silence of most
governments last week when UNHCR came under abusive attack, and
with the tendency of States to go back on some of their established
obligations in dieir consideration of Executive Committee conclusions, it
is no wonder that UNHCR must feel rather friendless at times like these.
Thank you for the invitation to speak at this seminar even though I
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officially left office as General Secretary of the European Council on
Refugees and Exiles (ECRE) in July. Considering die topic of our seminar
today it is perhaps worth recalling that the concept that gave birth to
ECRE was and still is diat it is possible and very desirable to create a
network of solidarity in the civil sector across frontiers in Europe for the
promotion of the rights of refugees and asylum seekers. That held true
from when I started at the end of 1983 until now, and that period has
seen some of the most incredible historical events on the political level and
unprecedented challenges to sustain the refugee protection cause. When we
talk about 'State interests' we might recall that die Universal Declaration
of Human Rights refers to the obligations not only of die governments but
also of the peoples of the world. So no discussion of responsibility for the
protection of refugees can omit die roles and responsibilities of the civil
sector. I would like to mention diis civic culture at die outset because as
governments and international organisations struggle more or less successfully
to deal wiui the refugee question in the future, die role and contribution
of die civil sector is likely to become more significant Some elements of
this are becoming clear as die full implications of the new information
revolution and of die reordering and redistribution of powers in die post-
cold war period become gradually clearer.
Speaking from a purely detached point of view, part of the motivation
to engage oneself in die refugee world is precisely because die refugee
symbolises so many of die forces of good and evil in our global society.
The way die international community deals witii refugees speaks volumes
about its human rights healtii, its fears and hopes, its weaknesses and
strengdis. It is normal when discussing die future of refugee policy to
find oneself trying to put tiiose issues in die academic context of evolving
international relations, in a legal framework of developing human rights
obligations, and widiin an ethical and values-based perspective of human
solidarity. That is why die language of solutions is so difficult; diat is why
programmes of action and systemic adaptations are full of difficulty and
can fail. One is dealing widi a volatile concept and difficult, complicated
and unpredictable human beings. How European and North American
States reconcile their national interests widi their international
responsibilities is a very complex question. From whose perspective are
we looking? What we do know for sure is diat we cannot go on as we
are widiout a rising cost of dissatisfaction, misery and expense. That is
clear. There is too much worry widi die current system, too much
criticism of States practice, too much uncertainty about die role of
UNHCR, too much human suffering diat is not being addressed for us
to stay as we are. And we cannot simply talk about die States' interests
in Europe and North America widiout taking into account die acute
inadequacy of responsibility sharing between die States of die north and
diose of die soutii.
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I think we have to break out of a tedious debate where the non
governmental side attributes the failures of current policies to the
unpleasantness of governments towards protecting refugees, and the other,
ie governmental, side talks all the time about the abuse of the right of
asylum and the costs of it all. I think — or at least I hope — that most
people now agree that the language of 'abuse' has gone too far. At best it
is a simplistic response to the complexity of modern migrations; at worst
it is a pretext for introducing negative measures that have no place in
seriously addressing global developmental changes. There never was a
'golden age' of pure refugees which has now collapsed into a regime of
abuse; it might indeed be interesting to see research into the past immigration
streams that concealed what were actually refugee movements. I do not
mean by this that we should avoid all controversy because I believe that
it is normal, indeed essential, in the evolution of human rights standards
to have a lively and informed debate. This is particularly true in the case
of the institution of asylum. Although it is ancient, asylum is never safe as
a concept; it has always had to be fought for between State power and
civil society. Current State practice is very discouraging; but civil society
in recent times has also not been very successful in fulfilling its obligations
and in creating a public consensus for governments to be generous and to
exercise that extra solidarity required to protect refugees.
Of course hundreds of thousands of refugees have been protected in
Europe and North America in recent years. I diink mat is admirable.
The fact that we have been able in Europe to maintain the principle of
asylum for fellow human beings in terrible distress mean that many lives
have been saved, many shattered people have regained dignity and sense
of usefulness and made dieir contribution to the common weal, as we all
do. A lot of people are, I think, proud of that, prouder dian sometimes
our governments believe. In fact I wish our governments were more
genuinely pleased. It is noticeable these days there is no passion in them
for doing the right thing! But having said that, there are a number of
problems that make you wonder how strong the concept of international
responsibility currently is. Surely in such an interconnected world
international responsibilities are State interests; reconciled they must be.
Why have our political leaders spent quite so much time and energy in
developing policies which stop asylum seekers coming to us, and indeed
in recruiting others to join in that strategy? Why do they find it so hard
to accept that other migrations also are inevitable, they must continue to
happen? I recall a recent quote from James Purcell, Director General of
IOM: where he talked about all migrations as being among the 'great
and good inevitabilities of this world. America was built on it; Hong
Kong too. You cannot stop it; nor should you want to. It is energy on
the march, and engine of progress'. But it is very difficult to reconcile
this with the fears of national politicians. I do not only mean people like
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Jean-Marie le Pen in France orjurg Haider in Austria, or indeed Vladimir
Zhirinovsky in Russia, but I mean all those leaders who talk about
national controls as if London or Copenhagen or Prague or indeed
Washington was the centre of the universe. At the height of the European
regime of deterrence in the later 1980s there were occasions when many
of us really feared mat die time would come when we would simply not
see die refugees any more, they simply would not reach us and report
on the torture, die murder, the repression and suffering they faced. With
all our technological and policing capacity we are after all nearly clever
enough to silence that voice altogether. Fortunately we were wrong, and
equally fortunately we shall never be that clever. However, die direat
seems to me to be still there. In mid-1996 I attended a conference in
California of most of die church related NGOs assisting refugees in die
USA. I was struck by how appalled they are at die proposed policy
changes in die US, not only in terms of die attack on refugees and asylum
seekers but in terms of the severe direat that die draft legislation before
Congress posed to tiiat independent sector which acts to assist refugees
and odier migrants. Last year also all die 60 member agencies in ECRE
met togedier, and in quiet tones debated whether or not the institution
of asylum would exist in Europe dirough the end of this century.
I think I quote Guy Goodwin-Gill when I pose the question: Why
have the European States been the leaders in die politics of restriction
and deterrence and die failures in addressing die agenda of alternatives
and solutions? In ECRE we have often reflected on whedier die anxious
politics born of economic crisis, recession, unemployment and xenophobia
in Europe in die 1970s and 1980s had produced such a inward looking
national egotism that habits of solidarity or internationalism had been
lost petmanendy. I distinctly remember Margaret Thatcher saying mat
the Good Samaritan would only help because he had die money to do
so, and tiius she gave birth to die ugly concept diat compassion depends
upon circumstances. She said it clearly: we cannot help die underclass
because we do not have the money to do so. This conveniendy forgets
that die money will follow the will to act and die not die other way
round. What has happened to die will to act? What are die costs actually?
And what on earth had happened to the greatest budgetary disappearing
act of our times, the post-cold war peace dividend?
The last 10 years or so have seen our external political environment
change significandy in ways which I believe profoundly affect die issues
of refugee protection diat we are addressing here. I would just touch on
some of die key issues in that environmental change:
First, the Zeitgeist is marked by a retreat from universalism towards a
powerful introversion and state of anxiety. Apparendy diis seems to
happen at millennia, so maybe we are suffering from a serious attack of
millennial Angst.
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Second, it is clear that there is a certain loss of nerve in many democratic
societies about their way forward in a wide range of their social and
economic policies. This is partly due to some of the unpredicted effects
of economic globalisation. It is also partly due to the pressures on the
one hand towards political devolution towards smaller democratic regional
models, and on the other towards membership of and the gradual ceding
of sovereignty to regional supranational entities, notably the European
Union. It is also related to the apparent intractability of social problems
of crime, drugs, poverty, unemployment, racism and the decay of cities.
One manifestation of the growing disillusion in many social sectors with
current political failures is the age old instinct of scapegoating, and of
course the refugee, the foreigner is a clear target for such scapegoating.
The failure of European governments to assume decisive leadership
against violent and ugly xenophobic tendencies seems to me one of the
gravest political abdications of our time.
Third, we confront the growing phenomenon of the so-called 'failed
States' where not even the minimum necessary guarantees are available
from States authorities for a livable and tolerable life; and while we in
Europe have been used to looking at this phenomenon elsewhere in the
world, we may have reasons to worry about the lessons of Yugoslavia for
the simmering ethnic conflicts elsewhere in eastern Europe and the
capacity of States to cope.
Fourth, there is a real crisis over the possibility and effectiveness of
peacekeeping, of which Bosnia is our nearest and most dramatic example.
Fifth, there is the shocking recurrence of forms of barbarism we thought
were past: the use of poison gas again, the wildly irresponsible use of anti
personnel landmines; the politics of ethnic cleansing; and
Sixth, there are quite radical shifts in the distribution of power among
States, NGOs and other actors which I believe is enormously important
but only now just becoming clear. I would like to come back to that last
issue later.
The responses needed to these changed circumstances are perhaps self-
evident but need constant reiteration: (a) belief in the idea that security
before conflict is always better value; (b) that there is a need for an ethical
universalism in public thinking; (c) that the promotion of democratic and
pluralist values and minority rights need serious attention; (d) that more
vigorous implementation of human rights mechanisms is urgently needed.
We also need to freshen up an idea which is after all at the heart of
UNHCR's protection mandate, and of all human rights thinking, namely
a universal concept to help the victim.
From my experience the dialogue between States on the one hand,
and many independent organisations and often UNHCR on the other
breaks down around the basic argument about who is being realistic in
the circumstances of the time. The stereotypical pattern is familiar: the
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so-called 'idealists' on the one side; the hard headed 'realists' on the
other. Well I think we need to worry about how strong is the international
refugee protection regime in the face of the new so-called 'realism'. In
the course of representing ECRE at international fora over the years I
have received many lectures about the realism, the realpolitik of the States
and the unrealism, even the irresponsibility of the NGO sector. It seems
to me self-evident that the true realpoMk of the modern world, if we are
to survive, is tolerance, pluralism, bridge building rather than
protectionism, fear and all the defensive aspects of the fortress mentality
that we currently have to live with. Why do the strong States persist with
policies that are demonstrably inhuman, very problematic legally and do
not work anyway? I find it hard to understand why policies that do not
pass the practicality test are pursued despite the evidence that they do
not work. You only have to think of the practice of detaining asylum
seekers, of interdiction on the high seas, or the chain deportations arising
from the use of the 'safe third country concept' to know what this means.
Is that really in States' interests in terms of problem solving; does it not
matter what damage it does to their international reputation and to the
fragile framework of respect for the global human rights regime? It seems
to me there is an awful lot of fear in the system, a culture of disbelief,
an unwillingness to believe that to do the right thing ethically can be the
best thing practically and result in positive outcomes. Part of it I am sure
is that those who make policy seem at greater and greater distance from
the individuals affected by their decisions. For example, very few civil
servants I have met as individual men and women would willingly wish
to see a Somalian mother and her family of five forced back across one
European frontier after another to disappear off the map in the Ukraine
thanks to the doctrine of safe third country. (ECRE identified this case
in our monitoring of the STC practice.) And yet that is the entirely
predictable consequence of the policies they help to draft, given what we
know about the state of readiness of countries in central Europe to handle
difficult asylum movements like that. I think we all know the consequences
when civil servants suspend their moral engagement and allow wrong to
be manufactured from their skills. The governmental sensitivity at the
criticism of these and other policies by the independent sector (and it
must be said by UNHCR at times) is one part of the reason why NGOs
have been almost squeezed out of the proceedings of the UNHCR
Executive Committee over the last year, contrary to the practice in other
parts of the UN system where there is a growing inclusiveness of NGOs
in the gathering of information, the formulation of norms and the
monitoring of compliance. There is nothing more damaging for human
rights policy than the absurd idea that there is a governmental world
where reason prevails — a world inhabited by serious and responsible
officials bravely carrying the heavy burdens of office, a world closed to
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the rest of civil society who are ignorant do-gooders, unaware of the
pressures of high level policy limitations and possibly even conspirators
in the abuse of asylum. Apart from the profoundly undemocratic nature
of such a concept, it seems currently to be used to support the creation
of a European world where our concept of human rights extends only to
the human rights of Europeans, who through an accident of birth or
history, are fortunate enough to live inside a secure and prosperous magic
circle. Otiier people's human rights will be of less importance and may
not be exercised among us. It is ironic that for its anthem the European
Union has chosen Beethoven's setting of Schiller's 'Ode to Joy' which is
a great poem celebrating the values of human solidarity.
Under pressure, responsibilities seem harder to fulfil; you have to dig
deeper to find die reserves of generosity you need; it gets more difficult
to persuade sceptical populations to hold on to agreements made at
another time when things were different. That is why in times of pressure
we need to be alert to the dehumanising of vocabulary. Have you noticed
how the use of language of refugee protection has deteriorated and
become confused over the years? You see it most notoriously in the effort
actually to define certain categories of refugee out of existence through
the narrowing interpretation of the refugee definition; you see it in the
failure of the EU last year to have the courage to accept the obvious in
regarding victims of non-State agents of persecution as being also in need
of refugee protection. Consider also the insidious process whereby a
mistaken policy, say for example the notion of 'Safe Third Country' is
dreamed up at a closed, confidential meeting, then refined, then becomes
a familiar debating item of international fora and eventually assumes the
dignity of a quasi legal concept. I think we are all, governmental and
non governmental guilty of letting language and conceptual standards
slip, sometimes in the 'realistic' hope that a concession here will attract
generosity there. I do not think this works; in fact I think the evidence is
tiiat that process takes us to a worse place. The effect is ratfier like die
constant drip of water on a stone. UNHCR colleagues will correct me if
I am wrong but it seems diat diere are real pressures on UNHCR to
abandon its principled objection to die European Safe Third Country
doctrine, and even to get itself involved in assisting States in developing
readmission agreements. A lot of diis pressure must be coming from
States who argue diat their integration or absorption capacity is exhausted,
although with very litde analysis of what that actually means. Hopefully
diis capitulation to die face of unreason will not happen, but die pressure
is symptomatic of die process whereby we punish refugees, shifting not
sharing die burden and reserving European space for Europeans only.
We all know diat diere are great pressures on UNHCR to abandon die
principles of die Dayton Agreement so far as die return of refugees
from asylum countries is concerned to die former Yugoslavia. The
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rationalisation for such a change will no doubt be heavily cloaked in the
language of realpoMk, of 'let's face facts'. But the consequences of
abandoning key issues of principle here are too terrible to contemplate;
and I do not just mean for refugees who may be forced back to places
they have never lived in and do not want to go. The consequences here
are about the triumph of ethnic separation, the profound implications of
the arrival of an apartheid state in the heart of Europe, the ugly lessons
for complex and delicate situations further east of the use of violence to
achieve ethnic supremacy. Who are the 'realists' here? When did the
premature cessation of asylum rights and forcible return of refugees ever
produce long term stability? What definition of realpoMk is this?
The degrading of language and principle goes along with two important
things that have been cut back in refugee policy in Europe: honesty and
transparency on the one hand, and money on the other. I do not know
which cut is the more dangerous. As regards honesty I think it has
strengthened the NGO position that we have not been afraid of openly
acknowledging the reality that Europe and North America are confronted
by significant migrations which are not refugee related; it weakened our
position and made it easy for governments to ignore us when we gave
the impression that all persons coming to Europe asking for asylum were
indeed refugees, or that it was impossible to return anyone who said
s/he was, but who in reality after careful examination was found not to
be. I think we have nothing to fear about honesty in the situation.
Regrettably the gap between governments and important sectors of civil
society was increased in the 1990s by the secrecy of so much of the
official policy making. Why have States been afraid of an open democratic
debate, preferring instead to work in private, unaccountable fora? Honesty
and openness has been cut back, and this contributes to insecurity in the
public mood. Can that be in the interest of democratic States? But it is
worse than that There are individuals and groups in Europe who dream
dreams of racial purity and have very wild ideas about what constitutes
sovereignty and national integrity. Unless in democracies we are
comfortable with, and give consent to, our own politics and the terms of
our social development, it is not easy to decide who should share our
space, how far we want to go in constructing and welcoming a multicultural
world, and indeed just how far we are prepared to go to stop people
coming. Secrecy breeds suspicion and fuels prejudice. As I said earlier I
think we have reason to be very concerned at the serious failure of
European States to provide the necessary political leadership to counteract
the poisonous doctrines of ethic purity and racism and xenophobia. When
responsible political leaders say nothing, when they carelessly use, or fail
to condemn, the language of 'floods' and 'invasions' it is horrifying that
they do not see how this legitimises the words and the violent actions of
the neo Nazi thug or the alienated and unemployed skinhead. The whole
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point surely of States taking concerted action against the members of the
extreme right is that they are dangerous not only because they hate
refugees and other foreigners but also they hate many values that the
rest of us live our lives by. But all of this needs to be done transparently
in the open, and public confidence built into the system of policy making.
I mentioned mat two things are being cut; honesty and money. The
second cutting is as damaging as the first and it relates to measures to
achieve economic and monetary Union in Europe. Let me make clear
that I think we are correct to stress the importance of the impact of
harmonisatdon measures in the European space, led by the Union, because
this a major engine for policy making in so many fields including refugee
policy. It is well known that die Union is much criticised by ECRE,
UNHCR, odier observers and indeed its own Parliament (which is kept
safely at a distance from the real decision making) because of its habit
of harmonising at die level of lowest common denominator, and die
disappointing achievements of die recent Amsterdam Treaty ofjune 1997
gave us cause for concern. But I would like to suggest diat diat aspect of
the Union is not die only direat to refugee protection. The odier direat
is die economic one, namely the effort to achieve monetary union by
1999 dirough arriving at budgetary convergence criteria. The effect is
increasingly visible: massive cut backs are being made in a number of
countries in the social budget for many vulnerable sectors including
refugees. Add tiiese cuts to certain new forms of managerialist mysticism
and we get an almost obsessive concern to cut, to downsize, to make
'efficiency savings'. However the result is that great institutions that hold
societies together are being reduced, and I mean this as much for the
national health services that we have as for, for example, the post
office, the transport systems and for the social services that support die
marginalised and vulnerable in all our societies, including refugees and
asylum seekers. Without these vital institutions diere would simply not
be a modern Germany, or France or United Kingdom. The constant
cutting back is destroying die sense of the unifying institutions in our
countries widi all the implications for social cohesion and social solidarity.
We are heading for the kinds of societies diat John Kenneth Galbraith
in die US and Will Hutton in the UK describe in dieir books The Culture
of Contentment and The State We Are In respectively: the two thirds one diird
societies, which are effectively disenfranchising large sections of their
population and where poverty and alienation can actually be ignored for
electoral purposes. And are we going to export that model to central
Europe, and still expect those countries to become the new burden sharers
for die refugees and asylum seekers who arrive in our new expanded
European space? We are talking here of countries witii still only
rudimentary individualised refugee determination systems and very small
resources for social welfare? My illustrations seek to make one point, diat
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current social and economic developments happening domestically in our
countries will weaken important institutions of solidarity, will lead to
more buck passing or even — one's worst nightmare — to the formation
of a European wide anti-refugee alliance. If that happens will the US or
Canada be far behind? That would be a very grim version of the
reconciliation of States' interests with international responsibilities.
What kinds of minimal questions do we need to address to the State
system to check out its responsibility and preparedness for the next
century?
First, at the level of fact and information which is so vital for dispelling
myths, identifying needs, and for supporting good refugee determination
systems, are we satisfied that our governments properly understand or
encourage understanding of the true scale and nature of the refugee
movements in Europe and North America in the context of the world
situation?
Second, and recalling the great progress in codifying human rights
principles and obligations in the half century since World War II, are we
satisfied our governments have a positive policy which responds generously
to persons seeking asylum. In other words do they willingly respect the
international hard law obligations they have signed up to in our names in
the 1951 Convention and all other relevant human rights conventions
relating to asylum and to the soft law principles of the UNHCR Excom
conclusions and recommendations?
Third, are we satisfied that States do everything they can to deal with
die causes of refugee movements and support those countries which need
to protect 90 per cent of die world's refugees?
If the answers to our three minimum questions were yes, tiien I diink
governments would stand a better chance of calling on public support
from their electorates for the policies of refugee protection and assistance.
Until the answers to those questions are yes, we have a lot of work to
do. How policies develop in North America and Europe matters because
we are in the part of the world where many of die donors and sponsors
of die global institutions are based. I think we have made some progress
in Europe insisting diat harmonisation of policies in die refuge field in
Europe and between Europe and North America means more than die
approximation of rules, but radier die combining of die immense
economic, political and diplomatic resources of European States dirough
human rights machinery to reduce die need for people to flee. In Europe
die last best attempt to bring an analysis of all diese issues togedier at
die official level and to put refugee policy in the context of wider migration
issues was die 1994 Communication from European Commission to die
Council of Ministers on Immigration and Asylum Policy. But action on
diis comprehensive approach has been limited and it seems diat tiiere is
a widespread and tired cynicism about this which has die same negative
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impact on the longer term as compassion fatigue does on the short term.
There are of course important actors which try to bring to States a
wider sense of their responsibility and future true interests than the
introverted approach which characterises where the major dynamic lies
at present. The European Parliament has always taken a progressive view
of refugee policy, the Council of Europe is traditionally liberal and human
rights based, and is playing a valuable role in the promotion of refugee
protection and other human rights principles amongst its new members
in central and eastern Europe. The Organisation for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has developed at least the beginning of
a language of concern for refugee, minority and migrant rights and the
consensual addressing of conflict situations. But of course the economic
and political muscle is in Brussels which is where we have to look for
leadership. I don't think anyone would disagree with the view that the
EU is an economic adult but still a human rights child, but there is great
potential, and policies are moving there in interesting directions as States
see the positive virtues of granting some of their sovereign preoccupations
to a regional body. And of course there is UNHCR. ECRE has agreed
and disagreed with UNHCR at many important moments of history, but
has consistently supported the strongest possible use of its protection
mandate. It was after all UNHCR which led a powerful critique in the
1980s against the harmonisation trends which led to policies of the lowest
common denominator. UNHCR too was locked out of the processes of
consultation for years and lost a lot of ground in Europe at important
moments of the battle. It is such an interesting organisation, created at
the suggestion of the NGO community after World War II by States
who were deeply shocked by the consequences of excessive nationalism
and who decided to impose limits on themselves. Since that time many
States have constantly given greater responsibilities to international
organisations such as UNHCR but then hold them back with very tight
mandates or inadequate financial resources. I remember a much maligned
former High Commissioner saying that many European States were
regularly violating the protection mandate of UNHCR, but he also said
that many of them did not actually realise that they were doing so. I also
remember UNHCR saying that NGOs are often the first and sometimes
the last line of defence for asylum seekers and refugees. Today the role
of UNHCR is interrogated from all sides, particularly about the centrality
of its protection concern. Many of us lobbied the Secretary General of
the United Nations raising our concerns that with the 'reform' of the
United Nations the protection mandate of UNHCR may be lost under
the pressures of an expanded humanitarian assistance role. We shall see.
The irony here is that the UN has never been in greater demand but its
role and performance has never been so severely questioned. Whatever
we think of the various UN agencies, we probably all agree that we do
18 Philip Ridge
not want to go back to an age where States try to retreat, keep the world
outside their frontiers and protect purely their national interests. The
challenge for UNHCR is to seize some of the new thinking and dominate
the agenda of responsibility sharing as part of its unique responsibility to
ensure protection. If its new enhanced status in the UN system enables
it to do just that, then all our fears about the further dilution of the
protection mandate will prove unfounded.
I would like to raise two issues which I hinted at earlier and which I
think will become increasingly significant in the debate we shall have
over the distribution of responsibilities in future refugee policy.
International relations specialists are beginning to point to intriguing
changes in the distribution of powers between States and civil society.
Among the more obvious effects of the ending of the cold war has been
modifications in many established political arrangements and relations
between States and regional organisations. Except in authoritarian
societies where the development of pluralist civil society is little known
or has always been strictly controlled, there has been a parallel and major
growth in the role and influence of NGOs. At the end of the 1990s
NGOs are now deeply involved in many international political and
developmental debates precisely because of their growing experience and
knowledge and the significant financial and human resources they can
deploy. Some startling reminders of this include die fact mat in the
development field NGOs contribute more in development aid than die
whole UN system excluding the World Bank and IMF. In the Human
Rights field one recalls the often quoted remark of the former Director
of the UN Human Rights Centre: 'We have less money and fewer
resources than Amnesty Internationa] and we are the arm of the UN for
human rights. This is clearly ridiculous.' This change in roles is gready
helped by the information technology revolution which is empowering
more actors with the kinds of information that was once die possession
of States. This means diat diere is a great strengthening of the capacity
of non governmental organisations which advocate for international
standards which may challenge die role of the autonomous States. The
information revolution strongly favours die style of working of networking
agencies. For a European network organisation like ECRE die speed,
efficiency and die cheapness of die new communication systems is an
enormous advantage in facilitating information and consultation of joint
actions widiin and across national frontiers. It also makes it possible for
European NGOs to develop relationships widi NGOs in other parts of
die world. For diose of us who want to advance die voice of die civic
society in international affairs this looks like a very positive development.
But civil society and governments will need to be very careful about the
far reaching effects of die challenge these global developments pose to
die attitudes of States to the effects of spreading power among more
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interest groups. If NGOs are really to play a growing role in decision
making, then the strong human solidarity they already possess and
mobilisation of public interest they can undertake will need to be matched
by very high standards of competence, vision and integrity. But just as
NGOs in the environmental and development field have very successfully
challenged the negative policies of many States, it could be that it will
be in the civil sector where the damaged spirit of solidarity for refugees
will be recovered in the 21 st century.
Secondly, I would like to put a provocative thought about the future.
We may cautiously comfort ourselves that there is a future for the
institution of asylum in Europe and North America, and we reassure
ourselves that with better policies and public support we could not fail
to preserve it. However I think there are ominous signs ahead about the
challenge to the kind of traditional western liberal values mat support
the principle. We already hear rising calls for a rewriting of international
Human Rights conventions on the grounds that they embody western,
indeed colonialist first world thinking and do not reflect, say, 'Asian
values'; and the 1997 UNHCR Executive Committee had to contend
with some States actually resisting the process of accession to the Geneva
Convention and New York Protocol, a recommendation that hitherto
has always been unproblematic. This might just be telling us that die
superiority that western States have traditionally claimed for their value
systems and institutions, based as it was on the kind of global power
which western States have enjoyed from the 16di century until now, may
be diametrically opposed in die evolution of the global civilisation of the
future. Political scientists are already describing a scenario where more
and more of the non western States will treat us widi die same respect
as we treated them in die period of colonialism. The conflicts of die
future it seems will not so much be between different western ideologies
but more likely by religious extremism, growing edinicities, and die
pressure of rapidly growing expanding populations on finite natural
resources. In such a world it may be very optimistic to assume that there
will be an inexorable spread of western liberal values, including our
version of die notion of asylum. It may be diat we shall have more dian
enough to do to just make sure diey survive.
Conclusion
I have tried to argue that the institution of asylum remains threatened
unless States accept renewed responsibilities nationally and internationally
but diat we are witnessing social changes mat are diminishing the necessary
ethic of human solidarity inherent in refugee protection. A key element
in die 21st century for refugee protection will be to arrive at stronger
mechanisms of shared responsibility, bodi between die countries of die
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north themselves, and between the north and the south. Such
arrangements are in the essential interests of northern States:
• in sustaining public support for the orderly reception of people needing
asylum;
• in preserving an important human rights value in the region that itself
is not immune from the potential for further conflict and refugee flows;
• in sustaining the concept of global help to the victim;
• and in humanely managing the forced movements of people in the
south in a way to minimise damage to the sustainable development
process, and to the dislocation of economic and other interests.
It cannot be in the interests of States to retreat from internationalism,
even if it were possible; the politics of chauvinism and strategies of
deterrence belong to the isolationist path which exacerbates problems,
and shifts burdens rather than leads to solutions. States need to give far
greater attention to more positive notions of collective security combined
with the vigorous promotion of human rights mechanisms. I challenge
the way the discourse between the States and civil society is currently
constructed around a misconceived notion of 'realism' and Realpolitik of
States and alleged 'unrealism' of other actors; furthermore I suggest that
in any case significant changes are on the way in the allocation of
responsibilities between State and non-State civil organisations. These
changes are due in large part to adjustments after the cold war and to
the realisation of the full potential of the information revolution. UNHCR
needs to play an uncompromising and uncompromised role in the
advocacy of protection principles with a greater leadership role clearly
and proudly acknowledged at the heart of the United Nations system. I
believe that only an open and democratic debate between States, civil
society, academics and the intergovernmental sector — with advice from
the refugees themselves — will help produce coherent and long term
policies which respect the needs of the refugee for protection, the legitimate
interests of States and the due fulfilment of their growing international
responsibilities.
The history of Europe throughout the 20th century until now has
demonstrated the importance of the concept of asylum on this continent.
It was precisely after the great bloodletting that ended in 1945 that the
international community launched a number of actions to bind countries
together in some human rights commitments. The assumption was that
human rights were developed not for the strong of the world but precisely
to protect the weak, the vulnerable, the dissenting, the victims. Which
presumably means that respect for such values should be strong precisely
at crisis moments of history, not so much when everything is going well.
And if we abandon that respect, it may not be there when we need it
ourselves.
